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Inherited caste identity is an important determinant of life opportunity for a fifth of the world’s popula-
tion, but is not given the same significance in global development policy debates as gender, race, age, reli-
gion or other identity characteristics. This review asks why addressing caste-based inequality and
discrimination does not feature in intergovernmental commitments such as the Sustainable
Development Goals, and whether it should. Taking India as its focus, it finds that caste has been treated
as an archaic system and source of historical disadvantage due compensation through affirmative action
in ways that overlook its continuing importance as a structure of advantage and of discrimination in the
modern economy, especially post-liberalization from the 1990s. A body of recent literature from anthro-
pology, economics, history and political science is used to explore the modern life of caste in society,
economy and development. Questions are asked about caste as social hierarchy, the role of caste in
post-liberalization rural inequality, in urban labor markets and in the business economy, and the effect
of policies of affirmative action in public-sector education and employment. Caste is found to be a com-
plex institution, simultaneously weakened and revived by current economic and political forces; it is a
contributor to persisting national socioeconomic and human capital disparities, and has major impacts
on subjective wellbeing. Caste effects are not locational; they travel from the village to the city and into
virtually all markets. Caste persists in the age of the market because of its advantages – its discrimina-
tions allow opportunity hoarding for others; and the threat of the advancement of subordinated groups
provokes humiliating violence against them. The evidence points to the need for policy innovation to
address market and non-market discrimination and to remove barriers, especially in the informal and pri-
vate sector; and to ensure caste has its proper place in the global development policy debate.
 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
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The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) emphasize equality
of opportunity and reducing inequality of outcomes, the elimina-
tion of discrimination in law, policy and social practice, and
socio-economic inclusion of all under the banner goal ‘to leave
nobody behind’. ‘‘All” here means, ‘‘irrespective of age, sex, disabil-
ity, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status”
(SDG 10.2). There is no specific mention of caste.
Several international human rights organizations insist that
worldwide over 260 million people suffer from discrimination
based on caste (or ‘work and descent’, the UN terminology for such
systems of inherited status), that caste is ‘‘a fundamental determi-
nant [of] social exclusion and development”1, and affects some 20–
25 percent of the world’s population – including (but not restricted
to) the peoples of South Asian nations and their diasporas. They have
lobbied for caste to be recognized in progress indicators and data
disaggregation, and have published shadow reports on caste dispar-
ities hidden in national reporting on SDGs (ADRF, 2017).
While prohibited by international human rights law, caste/
‘‘work and descent”-based discrimination is excluded from the
agenda of intergovernmental negotiations such as on the SDGs.
Should the global policy agenda pay attention to identities and
relations of caste as drivers of poverty and inequality? What is
the evidence that caste still matters as a determinant of opportu-
nity today, and what might its mechanisms be? Why is caste so
often off the agenda, and treated differently from age, ethnicity,
or religion? The topic is dauntingly large, and the present review
is limited to caste in India’s economic processes and policy
approaches.
The intersecting nature of identities (caste, class, gender, reli-
gion) that give poverty in India its distinctive social face means
that ultimately caste cannot be independently examined (Shah
et al., 2018). Nonetheless, this review covers work that empirically
and analytically attempts to identify the ‘‘grammar” of caste
(Deshpande, 2017) at work behind persisting socioeconomic and
human capital disparities in India (and by extension elsewhere).
Today, absolutely and proportionately, the country’s capital wealth
(land, buildings, finance etc.) is largely in the hands of the ‘‘upper’”
castes, and the ‘‘lowest” castes participate in the economy primar-
ily as wage laborers.2 Per-capita income or access to high-status
occupations decrease as we pass down the hierarchy, as does the
return on factors such as better education or capital assets, while
the proportion of people in poverty increases, indicating what the
Dalit political leader B.R. Ambedkar referred to as a system of
‘‘graded inequality” (see Thorat [2017] for analysis of data to
2014). Aggregating disparities in occupation, education and assets
into a Caste Development Index, Deshpande (2017, 93) shows that
the degree of caste inequality is unimproved (and sometimes wors-
ened) by the greater wealth or faster growth of different Indian
states. Statistically, in India the caste into which a person is born
remains among the most important determinants of life opportunity.
Caste is a source of embarrassment and controversy in middle-
class India. Is it relevant to talk about caste in modern times? Isn’t1 http://asiadalitrightsforum.org/images/imageevent/1736746861NCDHR%20-%
0SDG%20-%20Nov%2015.pdf accessed 21 January 2018.
2 There are no easy alternatives to the contentious and simplifying terms ‘‘upper”
d ‘‘lower” caste used in cited articles, but it should be clear they refer not to an
cepted rank, but a history of power, domination and unequal social recognition,
coded in vernacular as well as sociological languages.caste an ‘‘internal” matter of heritage and culture beyond the remit
of global agendas? Certainly, we do not find caste treated alongside
gender, race or age in the international analysis of poverty and
inequality. I will start this review (Section 2) by asking how caste
is conceived such that it evades global policy attention. This will
involve looking at the history of caste in India’s social policy.
Section 3 turns to anthropological debates on caste hierarchy and
change. Section 4 considers caste and rural economic change.
Turning to the wider economy, Section 5 looks and caste and labor
markets, and Section 6 at caste in the business economy. I will take
stock (in Section 7) of evidence on caste as a modern structure of
opportunity and of discrimination (Harriss-White, , 2014), before
turning to India’s affirmative action policy (Section 8). The final
section of the article considers what idea of caste might be helpful
to grasp its role in contemporary economic life.2. Caste in Indian social policy
2.1. (a) Caste as a residual issue of religion and culture
The claim that caste is marginal to development policy debate
requires some justification since caste appears central in Indian
policy and the politics of affirmative action. My point is that the
manner in which caste has entered social policy largely overlooks
caste as a continuing structural cause of inequality and poverty
in present-day market-led development, and instead treats it as
an archaic Indian cultural and ritual phenomenon erased by such
development, or as a social disability subject to (in principle, tem-
porary) ‘‘special measures” (see Waughray, 2010, 336–37)
The government of independent India was reluctant to use caste
as an explainer of poverty and inequality, and there was no place
for social classifications used in the colonial administration; hence
the abandonment of caste categories in the post-Independence
national censuses (Dirks, 2001; Jaffrelot, 2006).3 Both Gandhian
utopianism and socialist universalism expected archaic caste to dis-
appear with modernization. Nonetheless, the Indian Constitution,
which enshrined a commitment to equality in its directive princi-
ples, also recognized historical disadvantage, giving – by a presiden-
tial order (in 1950) – special protection and benefits to a list (or
schedule) of castes (first drawn up by the British in 1936) whose ‘‘ex-
treme backwardness” arose ‘‘out of the traditional practice of
untouchability,” without there being a definition or test of such
untouchability (Dirks, 2001; Galanter, 1984).4 Since now-outlawed
untouchability was taken to be a Hindu practice, the category of
Scheduled Castes (SCs, which censuses record as about 17 percent
of the population) excludes Muslim and Christian converts who, evi-
dence shows, experience equivalent untouchability (Ministry of
Minority Affairs, 2009; Mosse, 2012).UserView/index?mid=28545#sc1 (accessed 11 April 2017). In parallel, provisions
were made for a list of Scheduled Tribes (STs), the Adivasi or ‘‘aboriginal” groups not
discussed here. At one level, the SC/ST distinction could be regarded as arbitrary,
given the sociological continuum between ‘‘caste” and ‘‘tribe” (Bailey, 1961; Shah
et al., 2018), but at another it points to two distinct forms of identity and
discrimination: one rooted in ranked relationships of servitude; the other, rooted in
geographical separation and dispossession, especially in relation to forest-based
livelihoods (see, e.g., Sundar & Madan, 2016).
424 D. Mosse /World Development 110 (2018) 422–436Social policy on caste (and the guidelines of the ministry and
commission responsible) focus on the disadvantages of particular
groups, treating caste as a static or residual problem addressed
through remedial provisions, protections, safeguards and
complaint-handling, rather than as a dynamic relational problem
that might be subject to the state’s general duty to address
inequality and discrimination in economy and society.5 While
criminal law (the 1989 Prevention of Atrocities Act) prohibits spec-
ified acts against members of SCs, caste does not feature in any com-
prehensive legislation against discrimination and for the promotion
of equality in India.6 The everyday inequalities of caste tend rather to
be regarded as matters for social and (today especially) market-
based transformations.
Historians looking at the role of missionaries and colonial policy
explain how caste came to be officialized as a matter of religion or
‘‘the social realm” separate from political economy (Viswanath,
2014), and how caste was to be dealt with by reform from within
rather than state intervention. Indeed, addressing caste discrimina-
tion as a matter of Hindu religious reform rather than infringed
socio-political rights is what separated M.K. Gandhi from Dr B.R.
Ambedkar in pre-Independence debates (Dirks, 2001; Roberts,
2016).
As a matter of religion and historical disadvantage, caste falls
outside the purview of economic planning (Jodhka, 2016, 232),
and is treated as an internal cultural matter excluded from interna-
tional frameworks applied to other forms of discrimination such as
gender or race. While the UN bodies subsume caste under ‘‘des-
cent” (one of five ‘‘grounds” of racial discrimination), India rejects
this, and the monitoring by UN treaty bodies that this would imply
(Keane, 2007; Waughray & Keane, 2017).72.2. (b) Caste as politics
The enclosure of caste within religion/culture, history and the
nation (Mosse, 2016) separates caste from development; and this
‘‘culturalization” of caste (Natrajan, 2011) implies an ‘‘economiza-
tion” of poverty, that is a narrowing to the economic and material
of the ‘‘interests” in development that concerned Hirschman
(1997). More recently, caste has also become ‘‘enclosed” within a
certain kind of politics, especially after policy on affirmative action
– taking the form of fixed quotas or ‘‘reservations” in public sector
employment and higher education, formerly limited to the Sched-
uled Castes – extended these benefits to a more heterogeneous
set of Other Backward Classes (OBCs), a listing of 3,743 different
jatis or castes, some 52 percent of the population. The government
commission that recommended this change (the so-called Mandal
Commission) brought with it the hitherto rejected idea that caste
could itself be considered a criterion of socioeconomic backward-
ness (rather than just an effect of Hindu untouchability). But as
an extensive literature shows, the practical effect was not to bring
a new policy focus on caste in economic relations, but instead to
draw caste firmly into the realm of political competition (Jaffrelot,
2006; Jayal, 2015). Violent upper-caste protest followed the exten-
sion of caste reservations beyond the ‘‘ex-untouchables”.8 The
defensive response to this gave political substance to what was5 see http://socialjustice.nic.in/UserView/index?mid=1510. On the distinction
between residual and relational approaches see Mosse (2010).
6 In March 2017, the Congress MP Sashi Tharoor put forward such an Anti-
Discrimination and Equality Bill.
7 On controversial attempts to include caste within international or national law on
discrimination or equality (e.g., UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination or the UK Equality Act), see Waughray and Keane (2017).
8 The OBCs were given a 27 percent share of central reservations. Unlike SCs and
STs, this was not proportional to their population share (52 percent) because of a
constitutional limit of total reservations to 50 percent (although state-level alloca-
tions sometimes exceed this maximum).initially an abstract administrative category – the ‘‘OBCs”. Indeed,
Jaffrelot (2003) sees the political rise of the lower castes (in the north-
ern states), including the formation and subsequent electoral success
of caste-based parties as India’s ‘‘silent revolution”.
This alignment of political parties to caste categories of entitle-
ment was a particular moment in the mutual adaptation of caste
and politics: caste being how democratic politics takes shape in
India; and electoral politics being how caste is re-energized
(Sheth, 1999) with emergent higher-order clusters, new mytholo-
gies and leaders articulating perceived interests through caste
identity (Gupta, 2005, 417; Jodhka & Manor, 2017b). The large lit-
erature on different aspects, phases and regional variants of caste
politics falls beyond the scope of this review. The point here is that
the politics and public debate on caste with its focus on ‘‘reserva-
tions” has become significantly detached from the wider role of
caste in the economy and in social and economic development.
This autonomy of caste-political transformation from development
is demonstrated in Witsoe’s (2013) analysis of the government of
Bihar (under of OBC Lalu Prasad Yadav, 1999–2005). Despite hold-
ing political power and threatening the upper-caste controlled
apparatus of state-directed development, the lower castes were
unable to turn this power into institutional change that could bring
sustained or equalizing socio-economic gains for them.
Making a similar point the other way around, Jayal (2015) sees
the politics of recognition around the extension of reservations as a
‘‘caste-abatement”, distracting from growing economic inequali-
ties brought about by neoliberal reforms introduced at the same
time (after 1991). In fact, as the Indian state restructures in favor
of industrial capital, it also has had to respond to democratic pres-
sure from a voting constituency of lower-caste poorer people by
directing tax revenue from new wealth in industry to huge
increases in state welfare programs, deploying a rhetoric of inclu-
sive growth, and enacting various social and economic rights (to
education, food and rural employment) – a class abatement along-
side caste abatement (Gupta, 2012; Jayal, 2015; Varshney, 2017).
Studies of the upper-caste/middle-class politics of caste refusal
– the insistence that the market economy and meritocracy have (or
certainly should) remove caste as a modern concern (Deshpande,
2013; Subramanian, 2015) – suggest a muting of caste within the
professional policymaking class itself. An anti-reservations dis-
course regards caste as unnecessarily perpetuated by affirmative
action which penalizes merit and unfairly advantages lower castes
and their self-serving, vote-bank manipulating, political entrepre-
neurs (Jodhka & Manor, 2017b, 1). So lower castes become the
accused purveyors of caste and its politics while upper castes lay
claim to cosmopolitan identities or middleclassness
(Subramanian, 2015, p. 295). Others point out that the public
denouncing of affirmative action, and insistence that caste no
longer matters, is part of a politics of concealed caste advantage.
Thus, the public denial of caste as actionable injustice goes along
with its protection in private and its portrayal as a matter of cul-
ture. Thus Natrajan (2012) points to the view that what today
remains of caste is benign or beneficial. Caste is community or cul-
tural identity, part of the vitality of Indian democracy; caste pro-
vides networks of trust for business. Caste is anyway a private
and domestic matter. The caste-based violence that reaches TV
screens and newspapers represents an ‘‘abnormality” of normally
benign caste.
In short, policy discourse on caste is based on the notion of caste
as an archaic system and source of historical disadvantage due
compensation through affirmative action. It has, in parallel, pro-
duced a caste-mobilizing politics prompted by reservations and
anti-reservations, caste-party-political assertions and the elite
silencing of caste in the name of merit. If caste is erased frommod-
ern development discourse, it is on the premise that caste discrim-
ination is being eliminated through market-led development.
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the significance of caste in the working of the modern economy
itself, especially post-1991 liberalization.
The 1990s also witnessed an upsurge in anti-caste civil-society
and political activism from Dalits, ‘‘Dalit” being a heterogeneous
category of former ‘‘untouchables” with this self-ascribed political
label meaning the ‘‘broken” or ‘‘downtrodden”. The history of Dalit
assertions against caste inequality and exclusion is, of course,
centuries-long, but with the Mandal debate giving a national visi-
bility to the caste question, an upsurge in anti-Dalit violence fuel-
ing new social movements and Dalit political parties in the south
and the rising success of the Dalit-focused Bahujan Samaj Party
in the north, and with the birth centenary of Dr B.R. Ambedkar
(in 1991) giving focus to him as a political icon, the momentum
of Dalit politics increased in this decade. Moreover, caste was
placed on the development and human rights agenda of interlinked
local and international civil society campaigns, social movements,
political parties and NGO networks focusing on caste abuse,
inequality and economic exclusion, claiming a moral, political
and legal equivalence between racism and caste discrimination,
experienced by Dalits as ‘‘India’s hidden apartheid” (Bob, 2007;
Nagaraj & Greenough, 2009; Thorat, 2004). The varied forms and
effects of anti-caste development activism, and the transposition
of a ‘‘rights-based” to a ‘‘Dalit human rights” approach to develop-
ment would be the subject of a separate discussion (Anandhi &
Kapadia, 2017; Gorringe, Jeffery, & Waghmore, 2016; Hardtmann,
2009; Lerche, 2008; see Rawat & Satyanarayana, 2016;
Waghmore, 2013). Significant here is the fact that Dalit activism
has set an agenda that is now beginning to focus on caste in the
modern economy, and to reframe the caste and development
debate beyond reservations. Before coming to this, I must address
some basics on the scholarly approach to caste, especially within
anthropology and its village studies, the privileged site of caste
research.
3. Village ethnography: Caste hierarchy and status mobility
Most scholars concede that caste is a composite of disparate
phenomena (some of great antiquity) brought together in different
ways under specific historical conditions, and must be studied as
such. Regarding early-modern times, from the late-seventeenth
century, expanding trade and militarization, systems of state and
revenue in peninsular India, made society more ‘‘caste-like” in
ways amplified under British rule (Bayly, 2001). Few doubt that
descriptions of a ranked and self-regulating ‘‘traditional caste sys-
tem” by field anthropologists arriving in the 1950s carried a heavy
imprint of colonial rule: the way its revenue and property systems
dismantled earlier political orders and sedentarized populations
into village communities; the effects of its census categories and
systems of recruitment, reservations and (political) representation;
the pre-eminence accorded to Brahman priesthood and the consol-
idation of the opposed category of ‘‘the untouchable” (Bayly, 2001;
Charsley, 1996; Cohn, 1987; Dirks, 2001). The extent to which the
British ‘‘invented” the caste system or the idea of it continues to be
debated (Fuller, 2016), and revisionist history is now drawn into
Hindu nationalist denunciation of the very idea of caste (Mosse,
2016).
The varied and contingent nature of caste has not prevented
attempts at a unified conception. Some modelled caste in terms
of three key effects: social separation, graded status and occupa-
tional specialization (Dumont, 1980). Others (Lindt, 2013) distin-
guish different dimensions of caste. A hereditary dimension
comes from castes as endogamous kin groups (jatis), restrictions
on marriage, diet (e.g., vegetarianism) or eating/living together
being an aspect of separation. The control over women’s sexuality
in social reproduction underlines the centrality of gender to howcaste works (Chakraborty, 2003). In its economic dimension caste
is a division of occupations with ascribed status, perhaps within
an agrarian village system. In its political dimension caste consti-
tutes systems of dominance and rule at local and regional levels.
Finally, caste has an ideological dimension associated for example
with ideas of purity and impurity, ritual ranking or the moral-
bodily constitution of human difference and interaction (Dumont,
1980; Marriott & Inden, 1977).
The most influential theorizations of caste have privileged the
ideological. In his book Homo Hierarchicus, Dumont (1980) insisted,
first, that the multiplicity of endogamous jatis (castes) acquired
coherence at the ideological level, ordered through an opposition
between ‘‘the pure” and ‘‘the impure”; and second, that the four-
fold ranked social functions or ‘‘classes” of ancient India known
as varna (Brahman: priesthood, Kshatriya: kingly rule, Vaisya:
trade/production, and Sudra: service) provided a model. The supe-
riority of Brahman purity over Kshatriya power established the
ideological separation of status and power that, for Dumont, char-
acterized caste as a unique social system. A fifth avarna (without
varna) category comprised the socially excluded ‘‘untouchables”.
This understanding of caste as a Hindu social system for the
management of ritual purity or pollution separate from power or
wealth failed to provide a usable framework for empirical research
(see criticisms from Dirks, 1989; Raheja, 1988; Berreman, 1971).
Discourses of caste purity or honor were found to be cultural
resources serving (not separate from) political and economic
power, including the inferiorization of enslaved agrarian labor as
polluted untouchables. Elaborate caste orders among non-
Hindus, including Christians (Mosse, 2012), demonstrated religious
ideas to be inessential; and varna,while at times providing a model
for imitation in status claims, had little pan-Indian descriptive
validity (Srinivas, 1995). Ethnographers nonetheless (in 1950s-
80s) sought caste as a village-integrating system of occupational
specialization, with potters and priests, carpenters, barbers and
agricultural laborers rendering service to dominant landowner
patrons. Whether characterized in terms of managing (im)purity,
mutuality, caste dominance, unequal graded rights, agrarian
exploitation, a truncated remnant of a precolonial state system or
an anthropological invention, this so-called jajmani system was in
decline from the moment it was first described (Breman, 1974;
Fuller, 1989; Mayer, 1993; Raheja, 1988).
Service castes found their entitlements as village potters, cob-
blers or dhobis undermined by markets for plastic pots, rubber
shoes, laundries, or themselves sought autonomy from caste
ascription in market relations, sometimes building new caste-
clustered niches: barber musicians-run public sound services,
dhobi-run launderettes, potter caste hardware stores (Harriss-
White, 2003, p. 177; Wadley, 1994). Elsewhere, commons manage-
ment systems for water, fish or forests embedded in now-rejected
caste hierarchies became less viable (Mosse, 2003).
Least likely to lament a lost moral economy (Gold, 2009) were
those compelled through agrarian servitude into demeaning, dirty
and ritually impure work, including that associated with the death
of humans and animals (funerary work, flaying and leatherwork),
removers of the material and symbolic residues of daily life, trea-
ted as polluted in a permanent way, and integrated into village life
in order to be excluded: through residential segregation, from
ownership of land/house-sites, from common water sources, pub-
lic spaces such as teashops or temples, classrooms or markets, and
from or any mark of social honor whether riding bicycles or having
stylish haircuts – in a word ‘‘untouchability.” Where possible, Dal-
its have tried to escape ignominious caste-referencing transactions
and embraced market-mediated autonomy, contract and cash pay-
ment (Mines, 2005; Mosse, 2012).
Across the country, research today reports a levelling of the
markers of social recognition – food, dress, grooming, styles of
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inequalities” as Kapur, Prasad, Pritchett, and Babu (2010) conclude
in a large-scale study in villages across two Uttar Pradesh sub-
districts paying attention to changes emphasized by Dalits who
had seen improvement in their incomes and asset holdings since
1990 (2010, p. 48). Partly owing to caste humiliation being subject
to criminal law, village schemes of caste distinction are today over-
lain by rank-repudiating public moral narratives of civility and
equality, although Dalits suspect an ‘‘inner” mind of caste judge-
ment and disgust grasped only from within experience (Guru &
Sarukkai, 2012; Guru, 2009; Jadhav, Mosse, & Dostaler, 2016;
Waghmore, 2017).
While some (Kapur et al., 2010) emphasize such changes as
market-economy driven, others document the organized ritual-
political struggles at different scales through which caste power
has been challenged and citizen rights and self-respect asserted
(Mines, 2005; Lynch, 1969; Rao, 2009 among many). Economic
independence, numerical strength or political mobilization are
often preconditions for caste change (Béteille, 1965)). But elite-
led caste status mobility (sometimes through emulation of
upper-caste practices, or ‘‘sanskritization” (Srinivas, 1995, 15–
41)) can also produce widening class, caste and gender divides. Sta-
tus mobility and political competition has engendered ‘‘replica-
tion” of ranked differences among Dalit jatis (that Moffatt [1979]
misconstrued as connoting consensus with caste-hierarchical val-
ues).9 When Dalit men displace ignominious obligations within their
families onto wives, daughters and elderly mothers, who carry the
continuing burden of caste humiliation (Mosse, 2012: 182) alongside
the anxiety of sexual violence (Irudayam, Mangubhai, & Lee, 2014),
or when on acquiring middle-class sensibility they impose new
restrictions on Dalit women, caste again interlocks with gender
inequality (Still, 2017).
Some anthropologists account for changed caste in terms of a
shift from hierarchy to identity, and the re-coding of caste rank
as cultural or ‘‘community” difference, adapting what Dumont
(1980) first characterized as the ‘‘substantialization” of castes into
competing kin-ethnic interest groups (Fuller, 1996; Gupta, 2004).
It is in these terms that caste is seen to be reproduced through
democratic politics, and the articulation of interests through
caste-based political strategies and voting, producing new cate-
gories through ‘‘horizontal stretch” (Srinivas, 1995, p. 105) across
individual jatis.
The modern horizontalization of caste has not, however,
removed the vertical divide between avarna Dalits and others,
but made it more evident. In 80 percent of 565 villages across 11
Indian states recently surveyed, Dalits faced segregation and exclu-
sion in public spaces and markets (Shah, Mander, Thorat,
Deshpande, & Baviskar, 2006); and 27 percent of the 42,000 house-
holds in a nationally representative survey (in 2011–12) admitted
practicing untouchability in private spaces (e.g., barring Dalits
from entry to areas of the house, or using separate utensils)
(Thorat & Joshi, 2015). Significantly, such practices are strong
among lower-ranked non-Dalit castes, where education appears
to fuel rather than ameliorate status competition (ibid).4. Rural development: Caste and economic inequality
Longitudinal research from the 1950s shows unequal access to
new opportunities, whether in irrigated agriculture, off-farm or
urban employment, as embedded in caste (Epstein,
Suryananrayana, & Thimmegowda, 1998; Lanjouw & Stern, 1998).9 Dalit political mobilization has often been jati-specific. Widening differences
among Dalit castes prompts not just distinct political parties but demands for
‘sub-category’ reservations from the state.During the period of agriculture-led growth (the 1960s-80s Green
Revolution) cultivating castes gained from technology-driven
increases in productivity often at the expense of laboring Dalits
(Breman, 1974; Harriss, 1982). But in recent decades, land and
agriculture have weakened as a basis of caste power; and across
India, upper-caste village elites are found withdrawing from the
village economy and politics, their dominance replaced by frag-
mented centers of power or diffuse brokerage networks mediating
access to scarce but necessary credit, state schemes, markets or
jobs (Gupta, 1998; Jeffrey, 2002; Witsoe, 2013). Alongside, a rela-
tive decline in agriculture, the post-1991 liberalization period
saw an explosion of diverse non-farm employment in rural areas.
Recent reports of the seven-decade Palanpur study in Uttar Pra-
desh reflect a national trend in showing overall reduction in rural
poverty and rising incomes from better paid work, but also grow-
ing inequality as the poorest access uncertain casual work in rail-
ways, cloth mills, bakeries, liquor bottling, brick-kilns and the
like (Himanshu, Lanjouw, Murgai, & Stern, 2013).
Does caste contribute to this inequality? The picture is inconsis-
tent. While Himanshu et al. (2013) find most inequality in Palan-
pur between households, thus within rather than between
castes,10 Lanjouw and Rao (2011) argue that standard inequality
decomposition analysis underestimates persisting Dalit caste-based
disadvantages. They contrast Palanpur with Sugao, a village in Maha-
rashtra, where income inequalities from access to outside employ-
ment (through circular labor migration) have not been along caste
lines. Carswell and De Neve’s (2014a) ethnography of economically
diversifying villages around the major textile cluster of Tiruppur
(Tamil Nadu) finds opposite effects even in close-by villages: in
one, new demand-driven labor markets reduce caste exclusion; in
the other, power-loom industrialization within the village
entrenches caste power, inequality and untouchability.
Iversen, Kalwij, Verschoor, and Dubey (2014) used nationally
representative data, from 1993–4 and 2004–5, to assess the effect
of caste identity on inequality in the post-reform rural economy.
They discovered that Dalits have higher incomes in own-
dominated villages (‘‘enclave effects”), for reasons illustrated by
Anderson’s (2011) account (from a 120-village survey across north
India) of the way caste distorts groundwater markets such that
low-caste farmers have crop yields 45 percent higher when in vil-
lages where water sellers are of the same caste. Inequality-driving
caste discrimination in the supply of other inputs (e.g., seed, credit,
including by cooperatives) and the sale of produce is reported by
Dalits in a 2013 survey across 80 villages in 4 states (Thorat,
2017). Explaining the impact of labor and other rural markets on
caste, and caste on markets means taking account of many things:
variation in histories of land control or reform, urban proximity,
caste demography, and caste-political mobilization (Lanjouw &
Rao, 2011), but there is little to support a simple conclusion that
capitalism disrupts the agrarian order to ‘‘subvert and destroy
the caste system from the inside” (Prasad, 2008).
There are also non-market caste effects in development. Posi-
tively, Dalits have gained from a massive increase in state spending
on public goods which has equalized access to school education,
healthcare, housing, piped water and electricity (Banerjee &
Somanathan, 2007; Munshi, 2016, 48). To this can be added public
expenditure linked to enacted rights such as to work through what
is perhaps the world’s largest work-fare scheme under the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act. The NREGA self-targets poorer
Dalits offering what is dignified as ‘‘government work” paid at
the national minimum wage (Carswell & De Neve, 2014b). It10 Recently Stern (2017) reports higher inequality associated with lower inter-
generational mobility, suggesting that class differences in the village become self-
perpetuating as the better-off are able to take advantage of opportunity-generating
networks, the cost of which excludes the poor.
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can also fuel class/caste tension (Imbert & Papp, 2015).
The delivery of public services is also a source of discrimination.
A 12-village rural health care study across Gujarat and Rajasthan
found Dalit children experiencing untouchability (e.g., aversion to
touch during diagnosis) in the idiom of cleanliness from upper-
caste junior health workers; more so among government than pri-
vate or ‘‘traditional” practitioners (Acharya, 2010). A survey of the
national food security Midday Meals Scheme in 531 villages also
found caste segregation and avoidance, a mitigating measure being
to put the scheme in the hands of Dalit women’s groups (Thorat &
Lee, 2010). Similar conclusions arise in relation to the Public Distri-
bution System shown to discriminate against Dalits in shop loca-
tions, quality and price of goods and treatment of customers (ibid).
In sum, the picture of caste in Indian rural society today is
ambiguous. New freedoms and formerly-denied social honor
acquired by Dalits exists alongside forms of (often covert) discrim-
ination which also drive economic inequality. In fact, intense com-
petition for work in the post-reform economy that has shrunk
public sector employment while ‘‘not generating jobs in the private
sector at anything like the rate needed to allow people to leave the
land” (Jeffrey, Jeffery, & Jeffery, 2008, 36) gives caste a new sal-
ience. In Uttar Pradesh, Jeffrey et al. (2008) found upper castes able
to respond to under/unemployment by mobilizing capital and
caste connections externally and to invest in village-based busi-
nesses in ways unavailable to Dalits. While Dalit women and
men may experience village life as less marked by exclusion and
denied honor, caste is ever-more important to opportunities
beyond: access to higher education, jobs or business. Here caste
is an composite effect, bound up and disguised in the mobilization
of capital, networks into institutions of government or business, or
dowry payments – which may be oriented towards status/occupa-
tional mobility through caste/class hypergamous marriage that
precisely aligns gender and caste hierarchies (O’Hanlon, 2017,
439).
Caste here is mobilized competitively, not as status or ethicized
identity in the struggle for regional political power, but as a
resource or strategic network for access to the regional economy.
It is this that lies behind the public advertisement of caste belong-
ing, the marriage halls or student prizes of regionally-connected
caste associations that I have witnessed in Tamil villages (Mosse,
2012, pp. 252–261). Caste reworked as private connections and
capital, is not so easily perceived as such, even by those affected.
With the transition from honor to opportunity, caste increases its
invisibility.
Where caste becomes hyper-visible is in highly-coordinated
and sometimes lethal violence, often directed at Dalits whose suc-
cess, self-respect infringements of caste and kinship conventions,
romantic choices or access to public office (e.g., through success
in local council reserved-seat elections) so threatens the relational
standing of adjacent caste groups.11 Indeed, using a decade’s
district-level crime data (2001–2010) Sharma (2015) shows that
increases in violent hate crimes correlate with the narrowing gap
between the standard of living of Dalits and dominant castes; and
violence commonly targets for destruction, often by arson, the mate-
rial signs of Dalit progress (housing, shops, consumer durables or
vehicles). But it also takes forms that maximize trauma and humili-
ation, including sexual violence, public stripping, forced consump-
tion of excrement, and uploading humiliating attacks on social
media (Shah et al., 2018, 240). Such caste violence has in turn
prompted the formation of human-rights focused Dalit movements11 Significantly, an experimental game study in rural north India found stronger in-
group favoritism and willingness to impose sanctions on third-party rule-breakers
among high-status jatis than among Dalits (Hoff, Kshetramade, & Fehr, 2011).backed by NGO networks attempting (with limited success) to use
anti-discrimination for protection (Carswell & De Neve, 2015).
The Human Rights Watch report Broken People (Human Rights
Watch, 1999) documented the anti-Dalit violence in the 1990s.
In the next period, there followed a 40 percent increase in reported
cases between 2009 and 2014 (Ghosh, 2016), although conviction
rates remained low at 28 percent (for criminal atrocities against
SCs and STs, ibid). Criminal standards of proof (of anti-Dalit intent)
are an obstacle, as is caste prejudice within the judiciary (Ramaiah,
2007; Deshpande, 2017, xxxiii).5. Caste in the urban labour market
For many Dalits, the town represents escape from rural toil and
risk of humiliation to ‘mere poverty’ (Roberts, 2016, p. 55). In the
industrial workforce, rural migrants experience mobility, mixed-
caste working/living spaces and friendship groups. Individual
experiences of casteless mobility are a reality, but at the scale of
national data sets, as Deshpande (2017) concludes, the diversifica-
tion brought by post-reform development has not broken the
association, across states, of upper castes with higher-status pro-
fessions and Dalits with manual and casual labor. National survey
data expose glass walls against Dalit occupational mobility out of
caste-typed roles or low-end service trades (such as masonry or
carpentry) into more profitable ones or self-employment (Das,
2013). Under conditions of overall increased mobility between
generations (especially in urban areas) studies find intergenera-
tional persistence (especially occupational) greatest among Dalits
(and Adivasis, the ‘Scheduled Tribes’), and their occupational
ascents are more fragile (subject to downward mobility, especially
in rural areas) (Iversen, Krishna, & Sen, 2016; Deshpande, 2017,
xiv–xv).
The intersections of caste and gender mean that Dalit women,
with caste-comparative higher (although declining) participation
rates in the labor force, are particularly restricted in job mobility.
Despite often being represented as having relative gender freedom
(compared to upper-caste women) Dalit women face highly
exploitative work conditions. In a national survey, a third recorded
experience of physical mistreatment (Deshpande, 2017, 138–39).
While greater prosperity decreases violence against women (or
its reporting), it also brings status-enhancing restrictions on their
mobility and decision-making (Deshpande, 2017, 137–38; Still,
2017).
Recent ethnographic research explores the harder-to-detect
ways that caste identity shapes modern opportunity at every level.
Those leaving stagnating agriculture in search of urban jobs are
sorted into work graded by skill, insecurity, danger, toxicity or sta-
tus in caste-related ways. So, for example, Dalit workers in the
Tiruppur garment industry are more likely to find themselves in
the low-skill dirty dyeing units, and non-Dalits in the skilled tailor-
ing sections (Carswell, De Neve, & Heyer, 2017). A new wave of
rural industrialization creates skilled/managerial jobs for upper-
caste outsiders, but despite legally contested claims for such per-
manent posts – sometimes taken to the international level where
multinational companies are involved– those who lost land to
new complexes at best gain casual work as security guards, loaders
or janitors (Bommier, 2016; Donegan, 2018).
Drawing together case studies from across India, Shah et al.
(2018) show how neoliberal industrializing India is shaped by
inequalities inherited from village caste orders (see also Still,
2015b). It becomes clear that those who controlled the village land
hold privileged positions in the regional economy, that caste is the
character of clientelism in India (Jeffrey, 2002), and that caste net-
works in cooperatives, sand-mining cartels, on college campuses,
in the housing market, and in IT companies are central to how
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2014; Jodhka & Manor, 2017a; Shah et al., 2018; Witsoe, 2017).
Caste-based urban rental markets (Thorat, Banerjee, Mishra, &
Rizvi, 2015) shape residential segregation in Indian cities (Singh
and Vithayathil, 2012) with all that this implies for interactions
and networks, while reproducing as city slums the spatially-
marked village ‘‘Dalit colony” (Roberts, 2016).
Looking specifically at labor markets, three caste effects can be
mentioned: (1) occupational ranking, (2) network effects (or
opportunity hoarding), and (3) categorical exclusion. These can
be taken in turn.
First, regarding occupational ranking and the differential valua-
tion of work and workers, the caste-typing of jobs is strong in cer-
tain businesses such as (south Indian) restaurants with Brahman
cooks and suppliers (Iversen & Raghavendra, 2006) or sanitary
work with Dalit labor. Despite the self-representation of elite sec-
tors such as information technology as being matched to upper-
caste (Brahmin) knowledge and skills (Fuller & Narasimhan,
2014; Upadhya, 2007), identity-bound work is most characteristic
of stigmatized occupations, none more so than the filthy, dehu-
manizing and unprotected work of dealing with human excreta,
known as ‘‘manual scavenging”, campaigned against and prohib-
ited by law,12 but still assigned to the lowest Dalit castes, including
by contractors to the Indian Railways (Singh, 2014). Despite transi-
tion from manual scavenging to sewer work, as Tam (2013) argues
in the case of Ahmedabad, modern sanitation and sewer programs
have accommodated caste divisions and discrimination, while plac-
ing workers in danger, as attested by the regular and early deaths of
Indian sewer workers. Harriss-White’s (2017) recent analysis of the
informal waste economy of a Tamil town shows how, more widely,
the social cost of disposal of noxious waste is placed on undervalued
humans, socially shunned through discrimination of their group
identity as well as the characteristics acquired from their occupation
(p. 110). As B.R. Ambedkar wrote, ‘‘the caste system is not merely a
division of labor. It is also a division of laborers” (2002, 263).
Second, workers are caste-sorted through referral-based labor
recruitment, via risk-bearing gang-leaders and foremen who,
under shifting market conditions, use caste-kin networks to offer
employers flexibly-hired loyal workers. The resulting caste-
segmented (and caste-typed) labor markets are known from
single-caste dominated workforces in the colonial mills, docks,
railways, factories, mines, or indentured labor on plantations
(and their contemporary equivalents), sometimes traceable to
specific ancestral locations, or even to the role of an individual
recruiter-foreman (de Haan, 1994; Iversen, Sen, Verschoor, &
Dubey, 2009; Munshi, 2016a, pp. 23–26). Such hiring today pro-
duces a highly mobile ‘‘super-exploited” seasonal labor force
recruited to distant construction sites, brick-kilns, factories and
plantations, including Adivasis undercutting Dalit workers
recruited in earlier generations, now laid off or casualized by struc-
tural changes in mills or plantations (Shah et al., 2018).
Third, opportunities opened to an in-group by caste networks
also exclude others as a category, regardless of the characteristics
of individuals, as Tilly (1998) argues. Such ‘‘categorical exclusion”
was found in research on the construction sites of western India
which distinguished Saurashrian bricklayers from Dalit/Bhil casual
laborers, ensuring that even after 25 years’ work on construction
sites, in stone quarries, lime kilns and brick fields, a Dalit (or Adi-
vasi) laborer has no chance to get skilled or better-paid work
(despite a shortage of skilled labor) (Mosse, 2010, p. 1126). By
influencing skill acquisition, cultural capital and network forma-
tion, categorical distinctions and occupational differentiation12 See Safai Karmachari Andolan (‘manual scavengers’ movement’) – http://
safaikarmachariandolan.org.become self-reproducing (Corbridge, Harriss, & Jeffrey, 2013, pp.
252–253; Munshi, 2016a, p. 27; Tilly, 1998).
Nonetheless, education and skill development are valued as the
route to individual mobility (out of caste-occupational traps), espe-
cially among Dalits whose increased school enrolment is reflected
in a national narrowing of the caste gap in primary and secondary
education in the post-reform era (Hnatkovska, Lahiri, & Paul, 2012,
cited in Munshi, 2016, 35). But while education is deeply woven
into Dalit narratives of positive identity, progress and civility
(e.g., Ciotti, 2006), qualitative studies across the country point to
the shackles of caste-labelling, low expectations and classroom
segregation that defeat Dalit ambition (e.g., Nambissan, 2010, p.
277). Indeed, using a national data set of 51,550 households,
Desai, Adams, and Dubey (2010) find that while poor educational
outcomes among OBCs and Scheduled Tribes have to do with low
enrolment or parents’ education or income, in the case of Dalits,
caste identity independently affects the impact of schooling.
Beyond school, problems for Dalits deepen. Not only did the
Dalit/upper-caste gap in access to higher education widen in the
post-reform period (to 2004/5) – a time when ‘‘the premium to
education is rising in the formal sector” – but also, the return on
education for Dalits (in terms of increased wages) declined
(between 1983 and 2000) (Deshpande, 2017, pp. 75–82, 186; see
also Deshpande & Zacharias, 2013). These are, in the apt title of
Jeffrey et al.’s (2008) ethnography of the disjuncture between
higher education and employment, Degrees without Freedom. Not-
ing that for Dalits, each additional year of education yields a smal-
ler increase in wages than for upper castes, Das concludes bleakly
that for urban Dalits, post-primary education ‘‘confers almost a dis-
advantage” bettering the chances of neither salaried work (beyond
the small number and now enclaved low-end jobs in the reserved
formal sector) nor self-employment, while increasing their likeli-
hood of opting out of the labor force” (Das, 2008, 1).
There is persisting caste-based disparity in earnings (upwards
of 15 percent) for equivalent levels of education, greater in the pri-
vate than the public sector, and compounded for Dalit women by
gender disparities. The question of why equivalently qualified Dal-
its earn less, points to discrimination – in recruitment and role allo-
cation (hence occupational segregation) more than wages
(Deshpande, 2017, 152; Madheswaran & Attewell, 2007; also dis-
cussed in Munshi, 2016a).
Employment discrimination occurs at two levels. First, the job
market implicitly demands of applicants traits, skills, linguistic
and cultural competences which the education system does not
explicitly give, and that come from families transmitting a
dominant class-caste culture bundled as individual ‘‘merit”
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 494; Munshi, 2016a, p. 27). The ‘‘merit” that
recruitment managers of 25 large Delhi-based firms said they used
in candidate selection when interviewed by Jodhka and Newman
(2007, p. 4127) was emphatically ‘‘formed within the crucible of
the family”.
Second, discrimination operates directly on identities. Appli-
cants are sorted explicitly by caste (and religion), which is what
studies sending fake CVs signaling the caste or religious identity
of identically qualified candidates find. Discrimination is found
especially in private firms, in certain sectors (more so in call-
center than software industry jobs), and when recruiters are male
and Hindu (Banerjee, Bertrand, Datta, & Mullainathan, 2009; Das,
2013; Siddique, 2011; Thorat & Attewell, 2007; Upadhya, 2007).
Such caste-based discrimination is also demonstrated in experi-
mental studies on charitable giving (unwillingness to support iden-
tifiable victims with Dalit names) or exam marking (lower marks
for papers randomly assigned Dalit names) (Deshpande & Spears,
2016; Hanna & Linden, 2012). Drawing on theories of racial
prejudice, Thorat (2017) suggests that this discrimination mostly
operates on caste identities through socially framed norms,
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psychological prejudices.
Finally, identity-based discrimination has been modelled to
show that it is not only compatible with functioning free markets,
but produced endogenously by them, specifically as a means to
overcome coordination problems (Basu, 2017). Because jobs
involve interaction, a given person-type (caste) is preferred over
another because it is believed that other people will prefer the
same type, so improving that person-type’s productivity. Given
the interactional nature of most work, discrimination changes
the productivity of those discriminated against, reproducing pro-
ductivity differences. The notion that caste identity can thus arbi-
trarily become a ‘focal point’ of productivity and coordination in a
rational market, and that discrimination itself may even enhance
economic growth, underscores the need for affirmative action pol-
icy (ibid).
These caste effects are reproduced through differentiated
expectations of graduates, so that upper-caste/class candidates
experience privileged cultural capital and prejudicial norms and
networks as casteless merit; whereas, Dalit men and women with
limited finance and weaker networks, experience being persis-
tently identified with their caste background and in consequence
have an understandable preference for the scarce public sector jobs
(Deshpande & Newman, 2007; Deshpande, 2013; Jodhka &
Newman, 2007).
6. Caste in the business economy
Perhaps Dalits can skirt discrimination in the primary labor
market by turning to self-employment in business. Surely the mas-
sive post-reform two-thirds increase in private business since 1990
with half the workforce self-employed by 2005, provides the con-
ditions for the erasure of caste (Harriss-White, Vidyarthee, & Dixit,
2014, 40, 51). The prominence of caste in business and homophily
in employment suggests otherwise (Deshpande, 2017, p. xxi).
Again, in business, we find the three caste effects of (1) network
effects, (2) the ranking of markets, and (3) caste exclusion and
barriers.
Starting with networks, their importance is well known from
the way castes dominant in trade in the early 19th century moved
into manufacturing,13 followed by agricultural castes especially
with the post-1991 reforms (Chari, 2004; Damodaran, 2008;
Munshi, 2016a, pp. 14–15; Rudner, 1994). Caste networks for busi-
ness regulation are especially important where risks are high, formal
institutions weak and ‘‘selective trust” at a premium (Harriss, 2003,
pp. 766–67), whether the low-end and high-turnover opportunistic
Gujarat garment industry, or the high-end diamond industry in
Mumbai and Antwerp studied by Munshi (2011).14 Strong caste net-
works also develop in shunned markets, such as leather, sanitary
ware, cleaning services, and the earlier-mentioned waste economy
dominated by Dalits (Jodhka, 2010).15 This is illustrated by Gill’s
study of the Delhi waste business, which also shows how caste divi-
sions (here among Dalits) differentiate those dealing in segregated
dry inorganic waste, often plastic (kabada), and the most stigmatized
Dalit castes picking and dealing in unsegregated organic/inorganic
waste (kooda-kachhra) (Gill, 2012).
Markets are indeed ranked, and the more inferiorized the mar-
ket, the more caste-linked to occupational pasts. Dalit business13 Even in 1964, ‘‘23 out of 37 of the largest north Indian-owned industrial houses
listed in the Monopolies Inquiry Commission Report” were Marwari or Gujarati Bania
(Munshi, 2016a, pp. 14–15).
14 Using this latter case, Munshi (2011) suggests that, over time, self-reproducing
business networks substitute for caste connections.
15 With ‘‘cosmopolitanization”, some businesses here are slipping into the hands of
big-operations managed by non-Dalits, leaving Dalits mostly as workers, supervisors
or contract suppliers (Prakash, 2015, 70; Harriss-White et al., 2014, 67).access to markets is correspondingly differentiated. At a macro-
level, sectors such as mining/quarrying, construction and transport
are found to be relatively open to Dalits, while entry into health
and education, food, hospitality, finance and the service sectors
(where it is Dalits rather that the markets that are stigmatized)
is much harder (Harriss-White et al., 2014, 67; Thorat &
Newman, 2010). A micro-level study of south Indian entrepreneur-
ship showed a third of the 405-household sample engaged in
caste-linked business activity (e.g., crafts, dhobi services, musi-
cians) (Guérin, D’Espallier, & Venkatasubramanian, 2015). Caste
influenced the market for high-symbolic-value products like oil,
milk or rice, and Dalits were excluded from food or clothing mar-
kets (beyond own-caste customers), being restricted to inferior
physically demanding businesses. Even transport services were
segmented: non-Dalits transported people/long distances; Dalits
transported goods/short distances.
Networks and ranked markets exclude. Restricted access to cap-
ital or collateral (e.g., property undervalued because of its caste
location), to business networks, premises, infrastructure, raw
materials supply chains and markets controlled by other castes,
all mean that Dalits (the first generation to do so) have entered
the business economy at the bottom, running petty shops, as deal-
ers or agents. These are mostly survival-oriented rather than entre-
preneurial businesses, owner-operated or reliant on family labor,
without formal credit, and mostly rural and male (Guérin et al.,
2015; Harriss-White et al., 2014; Jodhka, 2010); (Deshpande and
Sharma, 2016; Deshpande, 2017, xvii–xxii). The small Dalit share
of enterprise ownership, initially decreased post-reforms before ris-
ing by 2005 (Harriss-White et al., 2014, pp. 51–52; Iyer, Khanna, &
Varshney, 2013, p. 56; Thorat, Kundu, & Sadana, 2010, p. 312). And
while there is diversification away from stigmatized activities,
especially in rural areas (but few benefits from microfinance
schemes16), prejudice still enclaves Dalit businesses in towns and
cities (Deshpande, 2017, xviii). This questions the presumed liberat-
ing effect of urban anonymity (Gupta, 2004, xx) (but see below), and
the market-era hope of fighting caste with ‘Dalit capitalism’ envi-
sioned by the Dalit Indian Chamber of Commerce (DICCI) set up in
2005 by high-profile but very unrepresentative Dalit millionaires.
Prakash’s (2015) study of 90 cases opens a window on Dalit
entrepreneurs’ experience of the liberalized economy. He reveals
the costs of exclusion from networks that circulate information,
give preferential rates, allow stock transfers, or facilitate the infor-
mal transactions with officials needed for business. Dalits feel
closed-in by humiliating prejudice. One in Uttar Pradesh tells
Jodhka (2010, 46), ‘‘while most other local businesses or enter-
prises are known by the service they provide or the goods they sell,
our shops are known by our caste names”. Half in Jodhka’s study
tried to hide their caste identity, especially where rivals leverage
consumer discrimination against them, impugning the quality of
Dalit food, health-related, education or other personalized services
(Prakash, 2015, p. 72). Pervasive discrimination suggests to
Harriss-White et al. (2014) an attitude that Dalits are expected to
be laborers; their entry into business is socially transgressive.
Setting up a business, even selling fruit or fish, is not just an
enterprise, it is a social assertion. Barriers to self-employment
lead many educated Dalits to withdraw into unemployment
(Das, 2008).1716 Research reveals caste prejudice and restricted networks behind failures of
entrepreneurial activity in Dalit women’s savings and credit groups, whether NGO-,
bank- or state-promoted (Kalpana, 2017; Guérin, D’Espallier, & Venkatasubramanian,
2015). Credit relations are bound-in with unequal power and status in ways that
entrench rather than weaken caste.
17 Some rely on improvizational economic activity as brokers/mediators (Young
et al., 2017), or join the ‘‘not-working poor”, surviving through what Ferguson (2016)
refers to as processes of distribution (rather that productive jobs), that is claiming a
share of other people’s resource or income streams.
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credit), more in recovering outstanding bills – but the overall dis-
advantages are hardly compensated for by reliance on NGO or state
initiatives (see below), and DICCI represents the elite end of Dalit
business where discrimination is weakest. Indeed, it is the smallest
entrepreneurs (urban and rural) who find it hardest to escape caste
identity effects. Using nationally representative data for 2004–5,
Deshpande & Sharma (2016) find the caste-gap in earnings from
self-employment greatest at the lower end of the distribution,
where discrimination produces a ‘‘sticky floor” effect,
(Deshpande, 2017, xxiv).
Spatial analysis shows discrimination varies across the coun-
try. Harriss-White et al. (2014) map three regional variants: a
‘‘northern” belt with low general business activity and low Dalit
participation; a ‘‘central” belt with high activity and high Dalit
participation; and a ‘‘southern” belt with high business activity
but low Dalit participation. State policy, such as on poverty
reduction, is a poor explainer of this variation (also found at dis-
trict level); but so (at state-level) are education levels, growth
rates, unemployment, Dalit political success or anti-caste move-
ments. Access to essential business resources (credit, skills, sites,
supplies) is a factor (Vidyarthee, 2016, p. 247), but strong dis-
crimination against Dalit business in the southern entrepreneurial
region, credited with pro- poor growth, is hard to explain
(Harriss-White et al., 2014, 59). In fact, Vidyarthee (2016) finds
urbanization the most significant factor associated with incorpo-
ration of Dalits as owners of businesses, notwithstanding the
above-noted restrictions on diversification of urban Dalit
enterprises.7. Caste in the post-liberalization economy
Caste in the post-liberalization economy does not denote a sin-
gle process or effect. As Harriss-White puts it,
‘‘[c]aste has a perplexing capacity to dissolve, as ascriptive char-
acteristics give way to acquired ones (such as skills, compliance
and trust, experience and creative competence), and as capital
becomes mobile. But at the same time it persists and transforms
itself as a regulative structure of the economy — sometimes in
the same site’ (Harriss-White & Vidyarthee, 2010, 318).”
As such, caste works both as a structure of disadvantage or dis-
crimination, and as a structure of advantage or accumulation
working alongside gender, religion and the dis/advantages of edu-
cation, occupation and connections ‘‘closed” through endogamy
(Harriss-White, 2003: 239).18 As in Tilly’s (1998) theory of ‘‘durable
inequality”, caste involves processes of both ‘‘categorical exclusion”
and ‘‘opportunity hoarding”. Moreover, the effects of caste are such
as to operate quite differently (sometimes inversely) on upper and
lower castes. Noting the force of caste differentiation among disad-
vantaged groups themselves, Shah et al. (2018) point to forms of
‘‘class casteism” (borrowing from Etienne Balibar’s ‘‘class racism”)
that stigmatize and segment identities, rendering cross-class cul-
tural/political alliances fragile. Simultaneously, caste inequality
depends upon, and is stabilized by, gender inequality or ‘‘graded
patriarchies” (Chakraborty, 2003). First, this means that the lower-
caste women experience labor unfreedom and market discrimina-
tion that is structured around patriarchy (work mediated by male
relatives, gendered social norms, or sexualized harassment, e.g.,
Kapadia 1999). Second, Dalit women suffer control and violence as
the effects of the failed masculinity of humiliated Dalit men
(Anandhi & Kapadia, 2017).18 As captured in Ambedkar’s early formulation of caste as ‘‘enclosed class” (2002, p.
253)We should be clear, modern caste persists in the age of the mar-
ket because of its advantages – its discriminations are opportuni-
ties for others, although rarely examined as such. Indeed,
constitutionally and legally caste is only a source of disadvantage,
never a source of privilege (Deshpande, 2013; Subramanian, 2015).
Caste is a resource, perhaps best conceived as a network, in part of
actual or potential kin; a network of enormous durability and spa-
tial reach (Munshi, 2016b, 2016a) offering protection (social insur-
ance), access (to jobs, business, the state), mediation (of disputes)
and control (over resources), beyond state regulation (Hoff,
2016). The value of caste-belonging is attested by the low and
stable rate of out-marriage at just five percent in rural India (and
the collectively imposed, sometimes murderous, upper-caste sanc-
tions against elopements across the ‘‘untouchability line”
[Chowdhry, 2009]). Among educated middle-class Indians, still
70 percent marry (broadly) within caste (Banerjee, Duflo, Ghatak,
& Lafortune, 2013; Munshi, 2014, 2016a).
The mutual insurance in crisis provided within jati networks at
village-level is well understood, and their role in links to education,
labor markets and for business has been noted (Munshi, 2014, p.
49,53; 2016a, p. 4; Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2009). Caste networks
similarly segment community-based organizations, the NGO sector
(Picherit, 2017), the bureaucracy and of course political parties. At
the same time, networks have their own effects. For example,
Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) argue that the cost of exiting vil-
lage caste networks explains India’s low rural-to-urban migration
despite high wage differentials; the richer the network, the stron-
ger the disincentives to migrate, marry or invest outside. Since
better-placed individuals can detach into individual mobility, in
principle, networks are strongest when there are few outside
options or, as with brokered labor recruitment, avenues of mobility
are provided by the network itself (Munshi, 2014).
Changed circumstances can alter, even reverse, the positive
effect of a network. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) explain how
caste networks that facilitated the mobility of one generation of
Dalit men from villages into formal sector blue collar jobs in Mum-
bai, limited the opportunity of the next, as boys were channeled
into network-linked vernacular-language schools, excluding them
from new white-collar jobs in the post-liberalization economy,
accessed in fact by young women through high-return English-
medium education. The idea that networks produce ‘‘dynamic inef-
ficiencies” (Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2006, 1230) and Dalits may
actually be disadvantaged by their networks finds support in
Deshpande’s (2018) finding from a retrospective study in Delhi
that while upper-caste secondary school graduates who used net-
works in job searches did better than those who did not, Dalits
using caste networks did worse than those who did not.
In principle, caste networks that fail to meet interests will
attenuate, but in practice the political construction of interests
including oppositional identity struggles hold networks together
when they no longer improve economic welfare (Munshi, 2016:
33). Or as Jeffrey et al. (2008) show, activist network-building by
educated Dalits (in rural Uttar Pradesh) may be a response to
blocked access to jobs or business. More generally, Dalit activist
or NGO organization is a response to their weaker caste networks
into business or bureaucracy (see Waghmore, 2013; Picherit, 2017;
Jaoul, 2016). But Dalit public action cannot easily challenge power
in informal processes, and Dalit networks that are strong politically
‘‘are often weak in terms of garnering access to assets and mar-
kets”, capital and jobs (Das, 2008, p. 6).
Indeed, the great scope and influence of caste lies in the fact
that, as Harriss-White (2003) points out, the part of the Indian
economy upon which the vast majority of people depend as labor-
ers or self-employed is informal, regulated not by legal-
institutional structures of the state, but through social structures
of gender, religion and caste, which extend their influence to the
22
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supply and price of goods, rents and labor in ways that ‘‘remain
hardly touched by liberalization” (2003, p. 241).
8. Affirmative action
The predominant importance of informal processes is why affir-
mative action (confined to the formal sector) is not the central
story here, even though (as noted) the issue of public sector ‘‘reser-
vations”19 has come to dominate national discourse and political
action on caste, being a focus for anxieties about survival or success
in the post-reform economic order. This produces activism both
against reservations, and to extend them; the latter claim (legally
unsuccessful) being for OBC (Other Backward Classes) status from
regionally dominant farming castes (Jats, Patels, and Marathas)
who feel threatened, for example by the corporatization of agricul-
ture, water scarcity and being outcompeted for jobs (see
Deshpande & Ramachandran, 2017). Of course, the prominence
given to the issue of reservations is telling for its diversion of atten-
tion from the role of caste in the informal structures of the economy.
Arguments, that reservations are no longer necessary because
caste is no longer important to inequality of opportunity, or that
they are ineffective on grounds such as poor outcomes, ‘‘creamy-
layer” benefits or inefficiency, are not supported empirically.
Reservations have positive effects in providing access to higher
education for SC (and ST) students who would not otherwise pur-
sue this (e.g., Weisskopf, 2004), and whose graduation rates are not
adversely affected by entering with lower qualifications (Bagde,
Epple, & Taylor, 2016). Reservations categories do have stigmatiz-
ing effects, which while painful do not, Deshpande (2016) shows,
undermine these gains, affect performance or block uptake.20
Importantly, the reservations system allocates resources (college
places and government jobs) that are scarce in relation to increasing
growth-fueled demand (Munshi, 2016a, 45). A state-wide study of
engineering colleges shows that reservations do redistribute oppor-
tunity in class/caste (but not necessarily gender) terms, hence the
upper-caste resentment (Bertrand, Hanna, & Mullainathan, 2010;
Munshi, 2016a). Thorat, Naik, and Tagade (2016) moreover show
that a majority of SC public sector employees are drawn from the
less educated and land-poor families (not a ‘‘creamy layer”),21 and
Parry (1999a) shows ethnographically the reach of direct and indi-
rect benefits from reserved jobs through community networks. But
since most Dalits are employed in the private sector or in (non-
reserved) temporary government jobs, the proportion covered by
reservations is tiny (three percent).
The idea that reservations displace competitive merit so as to
undermine the efficiency of public institutions is challenged in
Deshpande and Weisskopf’s (2014) analysis of 22 years’ data
(1980–2002) on the Indian Railways, which finds an increased pro-
portion of reserved SC/ST employees positively associated with
productivity and growth (2014: 15). The claim that reservations
perpetuate otherwise-disappearing caste cannot be tested against
a no-reservations counterfactual (Munshi, 2016a, 48), but on the
evidence is most unlikely. In any case, studies of reservations-
recruiting public-sector industry show reduced caste divisions
(e.g., Parry, 1999b, 137, 1999a), contrasting private sector factories
where jati solidarities are a ‘‘conspicuous feature of shopfloor orga-
nization” and used in recruitment through private contractors.19 Extending reservations to the private sector, where caste-based discrimination is
most evident, has been rejected politically (Thorat, Aryama, & Negi, 2005).
20 Bureaucratic impediments (not stigma) are the obstacles to taking up reserved
places, at least among SCs (Deshpande 2016, 19).
21 Thorat, Naik, and Tagade (2016, 63–64) point out that the purpose of affirmative
action is to address discrimination that is categorical, operating at the level of the
group and so different from anti-poverty programmes which could reasonably
exclude better-off Dalit households.Parallel electoral reservations in the lower house of parliament
(the Lok Sabha), in state legislative assemblies and (from 1993) in
local government (village and town panchayats) have generated
less controversy, occurring alongside a general shift towards
caste-based politics in India. This shift, research suggests, has
tended to lower the quality/competence of candidates from the
majority caste, negatively impacting the delivery of public goods,
while encouraging individualized public transfers to members of
the politicians’ own caste (Munshi, 2016a, pp. 43–46). At the local
panchayat level, despite intimidation, violence or upper-caste-
controlled ‘‘puppet” SC leaders, evidence across India shows Dalit
panchayat presidents increasing poverty-reducing transfers to
individual households, albeit mostly members of their own jati
(rather than all Dalits) (Munshi 2016a provides a detailed review).
The rising political voice of Dalits in the 1990s, and campaigns
on caste-based economic disparities under the post-liberalization
conditions of a contracting state, began to push affirmative action
beyond employment, education and politics to the business econ-
omy.22 There were for some time preferential loans, housing and
other schemes for Dalits, although immensely fragmented, variable
across states, and hard for researchers let alone ordinary Dalits to
pin down (Berg, 2014). The Scheduled Castes Sub-Plan (SCSP), which
allocates a proportionate share of the development budget to Dalits,
was largely notional until it became the focus of Dalit campaigning
and high-profile criticism for failures of allocation.23 From 2012,
for the first time affirmative action was extended to include market
support, credit/capital support and skill development (Vidyarthee,
2016, pp. 173–175). Responding to demands from an emerging Dalit
entrepreneurial class (lobbying through DICCI) and building on the
Madhya Pradesh state’s experiment in ‘‘supplier diversity” in line
with the pro-Dalit 2002 ‘‘Bhopal Declaration,24 the government’s
Public Procurement Order (2012) required four percent of all goods
and services for central government/public sector undertakings to be
purchased from Dalit small business suppliers, alongside credit sup-
port and skill-development schemes (ibid; Deshpande, 2017, xxiii;
Thorat, 2011; Vidyarthee, 2016).
Vidyarthee (2016) is skeptical about this shift from state-
backed group-based affirmative action, to a corporate ‘‘diversity
paradigm” for individual enterprise ownership (see also Lerche,
2008). The approach, driven by bureaucrats and a Dalit business
elite, finds little Dalit grassroots support from the poorer self-
employed majority (cf. Sarkar & Sarkar, 2016), and because evading
the difficult matter of private-sector job reservations meets little
upper-caste resistance (ibid). Based on his examination of policy
‘‘escape hatches”, procedural evasion, non-compliance, allocation
failures, mis-targeting and obstructing complexity, Vidyarthee
judges the new Dalit economic policy agenda as combining ‘‘dis-
cursive encouragement” with ‘‘practical neglect” (2016, p. 228).
Policy measures benefit only a tiny Dalit elite and fall short of tar-
gets (little more than one tenth of the four percent procurement
target up to 2014).
The overall impact of affirmative action is much debated.
Positively, Hnatkovska et al. (2012) find from 1993 to 2005, a
national narrowing of the gap between SC/STs and other caste
groups in education, occupation choices, consumption and wages,
such that the median wage advantage of non-Dalits over DalitsEspecially, the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) http://www.
ncdhr.org.in.
23 e.g., the notorious diversion of 7.4 billion rupees from SCSP to the Commonwealth
Games by the Delhi government in 2010. Between 2011/12 and 2015/16 only half of
the allocated outlay (8.5 against 16.2 percent) was made to Dalits, the majority of
central government departments making little or no allocations for Dalits
(Vidyarthee, 2016, pp. 202–203).
24 Adopted by The Bhopal Conference: Charting A New Course For Dalits For The
21st Century, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India, 12–13 January 2002 http://www.
digvijayasingh.in/Bhopal%20Declaration.PDF (accessed 23 Dec 2017).
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black males in the United States; while the rate of inter-
generational mobility had equalized. They conclude that improve-
ment in school education is the most important factor, even
though a gap remains between Dalits and upper castes in length
(amounting to two years) and quality of schooling (Deshpande &
Ramachandran, 2016; Munshi, 2016a, pp. 35–36). Attributing the
narrowed gap to affirmative action is difficult since this only tar-
gets higher education. Indeed, Deshpande and Ramachandran
(2016), by including OBCs alongside SC/ST and ‘‘Others” (upper
castes by proxy), and so providing a more differentiated cross-
caste comparision (and tracking absolute as well as relative gaps),
find widening disparities over a decade (2000–2012) in certain
areas such as higher education and access to the most prestigious
white-collar jobs as upper-castes ‘‘pulled away” during the period
of high economic growth.25 The ‘‘glass ceiling” effect of discrimina-
tion means that the caste wage gap is greatest at the top of the
income distribiution (Deshpande, 2017, xv; Thorat, 2017). Nonethe-
less, Deshpande and Ramachandran say that without reservations
disparities would have been greater, a conclusion supported by the
case of Muslims who without reservations have experienced a
widening of wage and education gaps (Hnatkovska & Lahiri, 2012).
Modelling caste gaps across sectors –widening in agriculture, stable
in manufacturing and narrowing in services – Hnatkovska et al.
(2012) suggest that under the particular conditions of economic
growth, the existence of institutions reducing the cost of investment
in education and skills in relation to others (ie. SC/ST reservations)
accounts for the pattern of caste convergence.9. The modernity of caste: Rank, network, identity
The idea of an integrated ‘‘caste system” and the alternative of
competing ‘‘ethnic”, political or cultural identities fail to capture
the range of interactional domains (including class and gender
relations) and adaptive dimensions through which caste is repro-
duced today. We have noted the caste-related value-ranking of
occupations, spaces, markets and people that culturally pre-
organizes modern capitalism even while being displaced by its
market processes. This does not manifest any one religious or cul-
tural system, so framing caste in exceptionalist Indian/Hindu terms
is mistaken. Caste processes can be understood in terms of gener-
alized social phenomena, such as ascriptive hierarchy, identity dis-
crimination, categorical exclusion, opportunity hoarding or elite
capture (Desai & Dubey, 2011, pp. 47–48; Jodhka, 2016; Tilly,
1998), allowing comparison with race, ethnicity and other
identity-based inequality (as Dalit activists insist in pressing for
inclusion of caste in UN conventions against racism (Nagaraj &
Greenough, 2009). Indeed, anthropologists have fruitfully revisited
the comparison of caste(ism) and race(ism) marginalized by the
culturalist framing of caste (Fuller, 2011; Pandey, 2013; Roberts,
2017; Still, 2015a).
Caste is also viewed comparably as a kind of network process,
mostly in economist (Munshi, 2016b) but also ethnographic stud-
ies (Witsoe, 2017), although rarely featuring in formal ‘‘network
analyses” that link micro-interactions to structural outcomes at
meso- and macro-level.26 Advantageously, network analysis would
avoid ‘‘caste” as an over-determined cultural or political concept,
or presume an independently definable caste logic, which is no
longer productive. Caste-influenced interactions are found to take
genuinely new and unexpected forms, perhaps interacting with25 Opposing inequality trends clearly co-exist, but the more nuanced picture from
Deshpande and Ramachandran (2016) methodology shows that the number of
criteria demonstrating divergence exceeds convergence.
26 But see Mohr and White’s (2008) analysis of institutional stability in Indian caste
and American academic science.other network processes around forms of consumption, taste or style
which independently socially include or exclude. Caste thus has
effects that fall well beyond the fields where it exists within actors’
frames of reference,27 such as when produced endogenously by mar-
ket relations, as Basu (2017) cited above explains, or in other ways
lodged within interactional systems. It is this flexibility of caste,
not continuity of a particular cultural form or social institution, in
which lies its resilience (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994).
But a strictly anti-categorical structural network approach in
which nodes are only a function of interactions ignores the impor-
tance of circulating cultural and political discourses of caste
(Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994, pp. 1430–1431).28 Explaining caste
as a network-effect also strips the dynamics of power from the
‘‘flows” in the network. Power is manifest as the capacity to connect,
as demonstrated in regional networks of dominant castes. Historical
and contemporary mobilizations to assert or protect status (caste
honor or purity) advertise the gains to be had from identification
with an esteemed group, strengthening the network (Hoff,
Kshetramade, & Fehr, 2011, pp. 472–473), or distance from past infe-
riorization. But caste power is equally asserted over others (espe-
cially Dalits) through curbing their capacity to connect, to act
collectively, or used to ‘‘pulverize and atomize” others (through
threat of violence) and inhibit the formation of positive identity
(ibid).
Alongside caste relations, caste identity has been reconceptual-
ized beyond the taken-for-granted, substantial and sui generis. On
the one hand, caste is an imposed societal categorization constitut-
ing subjectivities and self-worth, evidenced, for example, in Dalit’s
lower expectations in the job market (Deshpande & Newman,
2007) or the ‘depressed entitlement’ revealed (in a national sam-
ple) in their perception of lower levels of earning as remunerative
(Goel & Deshpande, 2016). We know from Hoff and Pandey’s
(2006) experimental studies that caste discrimination produces
‘‘stereotype threat” effects; that is, the expectation of negative
judgements about worth/ability, and fear of conforming to the
stereotype, with impact on self-confidence and hence perfor-
mance. Caste categorizations are thus made durable through their
impact on agency as well as the structural effects of exclusion, seg-
regation and blocked mobility. But the fact that Goel and
Deshpande (2016) find ‘‘depressed entitlement” effects mitigated
by election of a pro-Dalit political party (in Uttar Pradesh) or dig-
nified government workfare schemes shows that perceptions are
not fixed and that, as Appadurai (2004) argues, positive experi-
ences can change the horizon of expectation and aspiration.
On the other hand, caste, like any identity is performative, and
produced interactively (Latour, 2005). Identity is relational and
exists in the crossing between networks; identity is a site of strug-
gle for control and to secure a footing, to stabilize uncertainty
through relationality (as White, 2008 argues). Identity effects are
context-dependent. The performance of Dalit boys assembled from
different north Indian villages by Hoff and Pandey (2006, 2014) in
maze-solving tasks fell below others (deteriorating by 23 percent)
only when their caste identity was publicly announced. The power
of situational clues on performance, learning new skills or
responses to competition, brings the behavioral science view of
caste identity and its effects as ‘‘frame-dependent”.
In this view, the varied culturally-shapedmental models (narra-
tives, identities, categories, expectations, judgements, world-
views) through which people process information and make27 Of course, caste also remains explicitly a basis of prejudice (see recent survey
Coffey, et al. 2018)
28 Integration into networks is also the means to participate in identity discourse,
accounting for how on university campuses students may only become aware of the
salience of their caste as valued (or degraded) identity by virtue of the networks they
are enrolled into (or excluded from).
D. Mosse /World Development 110 (2018) 422–436 433choices may or may not foreground caste (Hoff & Stiglitz, 2016).
What differentiates members of privileged castes from ‘‘lower”
castes, is scope for the experience of the irrelevance of caste (albeit
usually detectable) among the former, who can ‘‘encash” accumu-
lated caste privilege as a casteless claim to private or public
resources as unmarked citizens, while the ‘‘indelibly engraved”
caste identity of Dalits overwrites all other identities being
hyper-visible in their claims (Deshpande, 2013, p. 32;
Subramanian, 2015).
The making-salient of caste and all its social judgments, is a
modern form of power over Dalits. Done subtly, in a great variety
of settings and amidst the expectation of equal treatment (for
example in universities), this can be experienced by Dalits as dev-
astating, hurtful, even traumatic. Such ‘‘dignity humiliation” – the
rejected claim to equality (Lindner, 2010) – is a source of distress,
turning the universities to which they gain access into places of
defeat for ambitious Dalit students or faculty (Deshpande &
Zacharias, 2013; Guru, 2009; Jadhav et al., 2016). The bearing that
this has on the tragic deaths by suicide of talented students in elite
institutions needs careful inquiry, but it has without question dis-
rupted the public narrative of casteless modernity.
The idea of caste as an imprisonment of the mind has given
salience to the idiom of religious conversion in anti-caste strug-
gles, not as individual acts but – as Ambedkar insisted to be true
of conversion to navayana Buddhism – as a transformation of
the ‘‘social conscience” to embrace an idea of humanity beyond
the social order (2002, pp. 122, 525). Recent study of its cogni-
tive and affective aspects, points to caste as inner experience,
its associated dynamic of pride, fear or anxiety being an effect
of prejudice and threatened violence (Jadhav et al., 2016).
Describing the incorporation of social hierarchy as ‘‘durably
inscribed” embodied feelings, taste and dispositions, others use
Bourdieu’s idea of ‘‘habitus” to capture the ‘‘caste mind/feeling”
tacitly shaping everyday sensibility and tactics that make caste
salient or not, through gesture, phrase or phone ring-tone that
through invocations of historical identity that presage prestige
or humiliation, connection or repulsion (Corbridge et al., 2013,
pp. 255–256).293010. Conclusion
Ranging widely over literatures addressing caste and develop-
ment, recent research gives reasons to pay the same kind of atten-
tion to caste in global policy as has been given to gender or race as
opportunity-shaping identities. What has been discovered of the
effects of caste for India is relevant to other South Asia countries
and their diasporas. That caste is bound with other identity effects
(gender, class) does not preclude policy attention to its distinctive
characteristics: forms of occupational ranking, exclusion and
enclosure, network effects, graded inequality and stigmatization.
As fewer Indians remain poor, more of those who remain in pov-
erty are Dalits and Adivasis, especially women among them
(Harriss-White et al., 2014, 7). But poverty-generating processes
are not entirely the same among these marginalized groups. As
has been shown, Dalits suffer restrictions to occupational mobility
occurring within the same markets. They have the least land, get
the worse jobs, have poorest education. Gang, Sen, and Yun
(2008) show that the relative poverty of Dalits arises from these
‘‘characteristics”, whereas Adivasis are poorer because of lower
returns on given characteristics such as agricultural land with
limited access to technology. Theirs is a locational rather than an
occupational disadvantage.29 Murali Shanmugavelan’s PhD research at SOAS tracks in fine detail the varied
communicative practices of ‘‘caste mind” (cati puti) in everyday village Tami Nadu.The effects of caste are not ‘‘locational”; they travel from the vil-
lage to the city and into virtually all markets where ‘‘cultural and
social relations play out” (Das, 2008, 3), and have impact on the
gains from developments such as education.30 The relational
inequalities of caste require no particular ideological justification
and are reproduced rather than erased by globally-integrating
neoliberal urban or industrial development. They ensure that every
opportunity for Dalit advancement, whether starting businesses or
gaining access to the educational gateways to middleclassdom, is a
source of prejudice against them. Prejudice is materialized through
a caste-networked economy, seen in the ‘glass-ceiling’ effect in sal-
aried employment and the ‘sticky-floor’ effect in self-employment,
and rendered durable intergenerationally through the closures of
caste endogamy.
The evidence presented here points to the need for policy inno-
vation to address market and non-market discrimination, to
remove barriers and provide support (to Dalits) in the informal
and private sector, and otherwise adapt interventions to the reali-
ties of caste. It also demonstrates need for informed discussion of
caste inequality, and to challenge the exclusion of the issue from
its proper place in global policy debate on sustainable
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